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NOT YOUNG GUNs ANYMORE:
DEMENTIA AND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Fredrick E. Vars
Dementia and guns can be a deadly combination. States as diverse as
Texas and Hawaii have responded with diagnosis-based restrictions. This
article evaluates the constitutionality, and policy wisdom, of these laws and a
range of narrower and even voluntary options. Some mandatory restraints
are very likely constitutional, but a diagnosis of dementia by itself may be an
unconstitutional basis for mandatory gun restrictions. However, my
strongest conclusion is with respect to a voluntary measure: current efforts to
persuade those with dementia to voluntarily relinquish their firearms should
be immediately supplemented with a system to allow such individuals to
prevent their own future gun purchases. The cost of this proposal is very low
and, because it is voluntary, it does not implicate the Second Amendment.
Dementia and guns can be a deadly combination. Take a recent
case from England. An eighty-seven-year-old man kissed his wife of
fifty-nine years, fatally shot her in the head, then "tried to shoot him-
self, but struggled to find the trigger after his glasses steamed up with
2
tears."' Both suffered from dementia.
Tragedies like the one in England seem likely to be repeated in
the United States. "The prevalence of dementia among individuals
Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to Caroline Harada. Thanks
also to Griffin Austin for excellent research assistance.
1. Rebecca Camber, Pensioner Who Shot Dementia Wife Dead in her Care Home
had Dementia Himself, 2016 WLNR 21164048, DAILY MAR (UK) 35 (July 12, 2016).
2. Id.
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aged seventy-one and older was 13.9%, comprising about 3.4 million
individuals in the USA in 2002." About thirty percent of Americans
live in a household with guns.4 One self-selected study found that
seventeen percent of dementia patients lived with a firearm in the
home." Another study put the figure as high as sixty percent.! Either
way, it is clear that many people with dementia have access to fire-
arms.
Dementia, a subtype of "major neurocognitive disorder," en-
tails "significant cognitive decline" that "interfere[s] with independ-
ence in everyday activities."7 Difficulty managing money would re-
flect mild dementia; difficulty getting dressed would indicate
moderate dementia; and someone with severe dementia is fully de-
8
pendent. Varieties are identified by cause and include Alzheimer's
disease (AD), Lewy body disease, vascular disease, and HIV infec-
tion.9
AD is the most common form of dementia.o Its prevalence rises
steeply with age and, though there is great variation," mean survival
after diagnosis is about ten years.12 It is marked by a "steadily progres-
sive, gradual decline in cognition."13 In one study of AD, the mean du-
3. B.L. Plassman et al., Prevalence of Dementia in the United States: The Aging,
Demographics, and Memory Study, 29 NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 125, 125 (2007).
4. Tom W. Smith & Jaesok Son, General Social Survey Final Report: Trends in
Gun Ownership in the United States, 1972-2014, 1 (Mar. 2014), www.norc.org.PDFs/
GSS%20Reports/GSS_- Trends%20Gun%200wnership-US-1972-2014.pdf.
5. Jason K. Hsieh et al., Firearms Among Cognitively Impaired Persons: A Cross-
sectional Study, 163 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 485, 486 tbl.1 (2015).
6. Karen B. Spangenberg et al., Firearm Presence in Households of Patients with
Alzheimer's Disease and Related Dementias, 47 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y. 1183, 1884
(1999).
7. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-5) 591, 602.
8. Id. at 605.
9. Id. at 603-04.
10. Id. at 612.
11. See Fleur Delva et al., Natural History of Functional Decline in Alzheimer's
Disease: A Systematic Review, 40 J. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 57, 66 (2014) ("Relatively
little data are available to help physicians in clinical practice to estimate the func-
tional evolution of AD."); Michelle Lee & Joshua Chodosh, Dementia and Life Expec-
tancy: What Do We Know?, 10 JAMDA 466, 469 (2009) ("Based on available evi-
dence, dementia prognostication remains a challenge and accuracy may remain an
elusive goal.").
12. DSM-5, supra note 7, at 612-13.
13. Id. at 611.
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ration of the mild phase was 5.6 years, of the moderate phase 3.5
14
years, and of the severe phase 3.2 years.
Cognitive decline is one reason to be concerned about people
with dementia having access to firearms. A second reason is the psy-
chotic symptoms that are often associated with dementia." A third,
and sometimes related, reason is behavioral disturbances like aggres-
.16
sion.
On the other hand, there is a constitutional right to keep and
bear arms, which many people want strongly to exercise. Consider
the following situation:
She is a ninety-year-old widow with mild Alzheimer's disease,
and her son is begging her, for safety's sake, to give up something
she considers essential to her independence and sense of control.
"You can't take it away from me," she told him recently. "It's all
I've got."
This may sound like a classic confrontation with an elderly moth-
er who won't give up her car. But it's in fact about a loaded .38-
caliber handgun that she keeps wrapped in a scarf in her top
dresser drawer in a Southern California retirement community.
And, in fact, someone in the mild phase of dementia may be perfectly
safe with a gun even if she can no longer balance her checkbook.'9
In light of this, it might be surprising to learn that Texas has
some of the strongest restrictions on gun possession by people with
dementia.2o Less surprising are the tight restrictions in Hawaii, which
generally has the most restrictive gun laws in the country.2' As the
14. Ee Heok Kua et al., The Natural History of Dementia, 14 PSYCHOGERIATRICS
196, 199 (2014).
15. Medhat M. Bassiony & Constantine G. Lyketsos, Delusions and Hallucina-
tions in Alzheimer's Disease: Review of the Brain Decade, 44 PSYCHOSOMATICS 388
(2003) ("The prevalence of delusions in Alzheimer's disease patients ranged from
16% to 70% (median=36.5%) in the reviewed reports, and the prevalence of hallu-
cinations ranged from 4% to 76% (median=23%).").
16. See Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REv. 1633,
1640 (2014) ("Delusions appear to correlate with violence.") [hereinafter Vars,
Symptom]. For further discussion of dementia and aggression, see infra 32.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. II; D. C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
18. Dale Russakoff, Guns in Frail Hands, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2010), https://
newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/guns-in-frail-hands/?_r=0.
19. See Carol B. Bursack, Armed and Aging: Should Seniors be Allowed to Keep
Guns?, AGING CARE, https://www.agingcare.com/articles/should-seniors-be-
allowed-to-keep-guns-169994.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
20. Possession of Firearms by People with Mental Illness, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice /possession-of-a-firearm-by-the-mentally-ill.aspx.
21. Id.
54 The Elder Law Journal
U.S. population ages, this problem will grow, and more states will de-
cide how best to strike the balance between safety and liberty.
This article considers a range of responses to the combination
of dementia and firearms, starting with a prohibition on gun posses-
sion triggered by a dementia diagnosis and closing with purely volun-
tary self-restriction. Only the most stringent restriction-mandatory
diagnosis-based possession prohibition-is likely to violate the U.S.
Constitution. Even an outright ban on purchase only for anyone diag-
nosed with dementia might survive. The constitutionality of more tar-
geted intermediate approaches-that ban both purchase and posses-
sion-is a serious question. And it is difficult to even articulate an
argument against voluntary self-restriction.
I. Diagnosis-Based Restrictions
At least two states currently prohibit gun possession by indi-
viduals diagnosed with dementia.2  Neither prohibition has been sub-
jected to constitutional challenge. The outcome of such a challenge is
uncertain,
A. The Texas Statute
Specifically, Texas law states that a person is eligible for a li-
cense to carry a handgun if the person "is not incapable of exercising
sound judgment with respect to the proper use and storage of a hand-
gun."2 A person is incapable if she "has been diagnosed by a licensed
physician as suffering from a psychiatric disorder or condition that
causes or is likely to cause substantial impairment in judgment, mood,
perception, impulse control, or intellectual ability." 2 4 A present diag-
nosis of "chronic dementia" constitutes "evidence that a person has a
psychiatric disorder or condition."25 This provision was added to Tex-
as law in 1999.26 I have uncovered no study of the provision's efficacy.
22. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.172(e)(5)(C); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-
7(c)(3).
23. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.172(a)(7).
24. Id. at § 411.172(d)(1).
25. Id. at § 411.172(e)(5)(C).
26. Id.
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B. The Hawaii Statute
Hawaii bars firearm possession by anyone who "[i]s or has
been diagnosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or men-
tal disorders as defined by the most current diagnostic manual of the
American Psychiatric Association or for treatment for organic brain
syndromes."27 DSM-5 is the most current diagnostic manual and de-
mentia is included as a "major neurocognitive disorder."2 8 This prohi-
bition went into effect as part of a bundle of more restrictive gun laws
in 1981.29 At least one study has found a corresponding reduction in
homicide rates in the 1980s.so
C. Constitutionality
The Supreme Court announced an individual right to bear
arms in District of Columbia v. Heller," but has offered little guidance
as to the content and boundaries of that right. Lower courts have
adopted a two-part test: (1) "whether the challenged law burdens
conduct protected by the Second Amendment"3 2 and, if so,
(2) "whether the regulation substantially burdens individual rights
and how close the regulation comes to burdening the core of the Sec-
ond Amendment."33 The first part is a threshold: if a regulation does
not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment, it obvious-
ly does not violate that Amendment. The second part of the analysis
determines the level of scrutiny: substantial burdens close to the core
of the Second Amendment must pass strict scrutiny; other burdens
must meet intermediate scrutiny."
27. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c)(3).
28. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO
DSM-5, at 16-17 (2009).
29. See generally Joseph A. Peters et al., Gun Crime and Gun Control: The Hawai-
ian Experience, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 55, 74 (2005).
30. Id. ("The change in homicide rates in Hawaii during the 1980s, relative to
other states that had similar homicide patterns during the 1970s, coincides with
Hawaii's implementation (in 1981) of a stricter set of regulations governing firearm
permits and sales.").
31. See generally D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
32. Angela Selvaggio & Fredrick E. Vars, "Bind Me More Tightly Still": Volun-
tary Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 671, 676 (2016) (quoting
United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013)).
33. Id. at 679.
34. See id.
35. Peruta v. City of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014); Fredrick E.
Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465, 1491 (2015) (questioning
whether strict scrutiny is consistent with Heller).
55
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There is an argument that a dementia gun ban falls outside the
scope of the Second Amendment. The Court in Heller stated that its
opinion recognizing an individual's right to bear arms did not call in-
to question the longstanding prohibition on gun possession by the
mentally ill.3 Dementia is a mental illness. On the other hand, as dis-
cussed below, the "longstanding prohibition" referenced in Heller is
triggered by more than just a diagnosis. There is no longstanding gun
prohibition on dementia patients.3 7 So while one court of appeals has
suggested that simply targeting a high-risk population avoids Second
38
Amendment scrutiny, it seems much more likely that a ban on gun
possession by people with dementia will be deemed to implicate the
391
right to bear arms.
The question then becomes level of scrutiny. The key determi-
nants again are the substantiality of the burden and its proximity to
the core of the Second Amendment. The "core" is the "right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home.,4 1 A total prohibition on gun possession prevents the defensive
use of firearms completely, both inside and outside the home.42 That is
the argument for strict scrutiny. The counter-argument is that an indi-
vidual with a diagnosis of dementia is not the kind of "law-abiding,
responsible citizen" the Second Amendment was intended to protect.
That assertion, like the analysis under either level of scrutiny, turns on
the association of dementia and violence, suicide, and gun accidents."
Intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny both focus on the strength of
the government's justification for a particular gun restriction.4
36. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
37. Id. at 675.
38. United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919,925 (8th Cir. 2010).
39. Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese,
627 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010).
40. Id.
41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
42. Id. at 635.
43. See id. at 628-29.
44. Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally III Have a
Right to Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2013) (arguing that prevent-
ing suicide is as compelling a government interest as preventing homicide); Cam-
eron Desmond, From Cities to Schoolyards: The Implications of an Individual Right To
Bear Arms on the Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043,
1060 (2008) ("Certainly, public safety--preventing murder, suicide, and gun-related
accidents--is a compelling government interest.").
45. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
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Dementia is associated with violence.4 One long-term study
(ten years) found that up to ninety-six percent of patients with demen-
tia showed aggressive behavior over the course of their illness.4 7 "Ag-
gression was found to be positively associated with a diagnosis of
dementia." Rates of aggression are significantly higher for dementia
patients: one study of community dwelling elders where aggression
occurred in twenty-four percent of dementia patients, but in only
three percent of participants without dementia.4 9 And while homicide
by the elderly is rare, an association with dementia has been report-
ed.4
People with dementia may be at elevated risk of suicide.5 ' The
first nationwide study of the question, from Denmark, found that de-
mentia patients between fifty and sixty-nine years of age with hospital
presentations of dementia were over eight times more likely to com-
mit suicide, and those seventy and older three times.52 But the picture
is far from clear. A subsequent review article concluded that: "Overall,
the risk of suicide in dementia appears to be the same or less than that
of the age-matched general population but is increased soon after di-
agnosis, in patients diagnosed with dementia during hospitalization
and in Huntington's disease."- In short, some identifiable sub-groups
of patients with dementia are at higher risk for suicide, but apparently
not enough to drive up the overall rate.
46. Marshall B. Kapp, The Physician's Responsibility Concerning Firearms and
Older Patients, 25-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 159, 164 (2016) ("The correlation be-
tween dementia and firearm violence and injury has been documented.").
47. See generally Gabriele Cipriani et al., Violent and Criminal Manifestations in
Dementia Patients, 16 GERIATRICS & GERONTOLOGY INT'L 541 (2016).
48. Pat Gibbons et al., A Study of Aggression Among Referrals to a Community-
Based Psychiatry of Old Age Service, 12 INT'L J. GERIATR. PSYCHIATRY 384, 384 (1997).
49. See Tracy Wharton & Bryan K. Ford, What Is Known About Dementia Care
Recipient Violence & Aggression Against Caregivers?, 57 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC'Y.
WORK 460, 464-65 (2014).
50. Cipriani et al., supra note 47, at 544-45; Stdphane Richard-Devantoy et al.,
Homicide and Dementia in Older Adults: The Key Role of Dysexecutive Function, 71 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1402, 1402 (2010). See also Edith Greene et al., Granny,
(Don't) Get Your Gun: Competency Issues in Gun Ownership by Older Adults, 25
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 405, 411 (2007) ("more serious aggressive and violent acts, includ-
ing self-harm and homicide, are not uncommon").
51. Annette Erlangsen et al., Hospital-Diagnosed Dementia and Suicide: A Longi-
tudinal Study Using Prospective, Nationwide Register Data, 16 AM. J. GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY 220,220 (2008).
52. Id.
53. Camilla Haw et al., Dementia and Suicidal Behavior: a Review of the Literature,
21 INT'L PSYCHOGERIATRIC 440, 440 (2009).
54. I found no studies on rates of gun accidents by dementia patients.
57
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Do these findings mean people with dementia are not "law-
abiding, responsible citizens?" Do these findings mean that a demen-
tia gun ban is substantially related to an important government inter-
est (as required by intermediate scrutiny)?" Do these findings mean
that such a ban is narrowly tailored to a compelling government in-
terest (strict scrutiny)?56 These are difficult questions.
A diagnosis of dementia, unlike a criminal conviction,7 does
not by itself mean the individual is no longer "law-abiding." Howev-
er, a legislature could reasonably conclude that dementia patients, like
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, "tend to be relatively irresponsible."5 8
This quoted language comes from a Fifth Circuit opinion reject-
ing a Second Amendment challenge to a federal statute prohibiting
handguns sales to persons under the age of twenty-one.59 The court
applied intermediate rather than strict scrutiny in part because Con-
gress could reasonably believe that juveniles were less responsible
than adults.60 The Fifth Circuit also justified selecting intermediate
61
scrutiny because the age-based prohibition was temporary. People
are not cured of dementia, so a ban on them would not be temporary.
But because dementia is progressive and all patients eventually lose
the ability to use firearms responsibly, any overreach would arguably
be temporary. Recall that the mild phase of dementia lasts only 5.6
years on average.62 Still, it must be conceded that the court had anoth-
er justification: sale to young people was prohibited, but not posses-
sion, so the burden on the core of the Second Amendment was less
63
substantial. Parents could lawfully provide handguns to their chil-
dren for their defensive use.
This discussion suggests that the government has an option: ei-
ther ban purchase and possession by people with dementia (as does
55. Kachalsky v. Cty of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81,96 (2d Cir. 2012).
56. Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 179 (4th Cir. 2016).
57. United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2012).
58. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 206 (5th Cir. 2012).
59. Id. at 211-12.
60. Id. at 205.
61. Id. at 207.
62. Kua et al., supra note 14, at 196.
63. NRA v. ATF, 700 F.3d at 206 ("...these laws do not strike the core of the
Second Amendment because they do not prevent 18-to-20-year-olds from pos-
sessing and using handguns 'in defense of hearth and home."').
64. Id. at 207.
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Hawaii and Texas), or ban just purchase.6 The latter, purchase-only,
restriction might be subject to intermediate scrutiny just like the eight-
een- to twenty-year old purchase ban. On the other hand, the course
of an individual's dementia is uncertain and it will likely be longer
6
than three years before a mild case becomes moderate. There is,
therefore, a good chance that strict scrutiny would apply.
There is an even stronger chance that the first option-
permanently banning both purchase and possession, including within
the home-would be subject to strict scrutiny. The choice matters for
both proposals because the evidence of increased risk is weighty but
not overwhelming. The studies finding increased aggression and sui-
cide rates would very likely satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Even when
applying intermediate scrutiny to gun laws, "[it is the legislature's
job, not [the court's], to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy
judgments."6 7 On the other hand, the evidence of heightened risk
could well be insufficient to meet strict scrutiny. In sum, a purchase-
only ban would likely stand, but a purchase and possession ban
would likely fall.
II. Narrower Approaches
A. Diagnosis-Triggered Firearm Safety Testing
There is a narrower way to use a dementia diagnosis: not to
prohibit gun possession, but rather as a trigger for mandatory gun
safety testing. A doctor who diagnoses dementia (or perhaps only
moderate or severe cases) would be required to report that infor-
mation to a state licensing authority. If a person with dementia want-
ed to keep their firearms, they would have a short period of time to
undergo an evaluation of their ability to safely store and use a firearm.
The failure to pass such a test would lead to a loss of gun rights. A
person who passes would be subject to periodic retesting.
65. Another option would be to ban purchase and possession by individuals
only in the moderate or severe stages of dementia. Those in the mild phase would
be unaffected. Such an approach would very likely be constitutional.
66. Kua et al., supra note 14, at 199.
67. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 99; see also Jason T. Anderson, Second Amendment
Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia
v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 547, 592 (2009) ("It could be argued that ... situations
[involving the application of intermediate scrutiny where studies are inconclusive]
suggest an appropriate opportunity for judicial deference to the legislative branch-
es.").
59
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This idea is based on current and proposed approaches to driv-
ing. Older drivers have a relatively high rate of driving fatalities.6 Be-
cause dementia can affect one's ability to drive, California and Penn-
sylvania require doctors to report a diagnosis of dementia.
One concern with mandatory physician reporting is that pa-
tients who want to keep firearms will become reluctant to seek needed
medical care or to disclose symptoms that might call into question
cognitive capacity.7 0 This is a legitimate concern, but would need to be
weighed against the risk of gun misuse. A second drawback of this
approach is expense. Every state already conducts driving tests, so the
burden of additional testing there is merely incremental. Most states
do not require handgun or firearm licenses, and very few mandate
specific training.7 Testing for firearm safety skills would therefore ne-
cessitate significant costs.
On the other hand, if the test was well designed and an appeal
process was available, this approach would be almost perfectly target-
ed to disqualify only those who are unable to responsibly possess a
firearm. Its constitutionality is almost beyond question.
B. Current Federal Law
Federal statute prohibits gun possession by anyone "who has
been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to
a mental institution."7 A mere diagnosis of dementia is obviously in-
sufficient to fall within either category, but it can be relevant to both.
Federal regulation defines "a mental defective" to be a person
who as a result of "mental illness, incompetency, condition, or dis-
ease" is either a danger to himself or others or lacks the mental capaci-
ty to manage his own affairs. Many people with moderate or severe
dementia may meet that standard, but only those who have been de-
termined to do so by "a court, board, commission, or other lawful au-
thority" (i.e., "adjudicated") will be disqualified from gun possession.
68. Older Drivers, INS. INFO. INST., 2002, at 1 WL 1049001.
69. Id. at 5; Maureen Cleary, Driving with Dementia: the Necessity of a Compre-
hensive Reporting Scheme, 24 ELDER L. J. 151, 158 (2016).
70. Cleary, supra note 69, at 166.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012).
72. Id.
73. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014).
74. Id.
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Thus, having executed a power of attorney is not disqualifying, but
being subject to guardianship is.5
Commitment to a mental institution is merely one variety of
mental-defect adjudication. "Civil commitment statutes differ by state,
but all states require the following two criteria for commitment: (1) the
respondent must have a mental illness and (2) the respondent must be
a danger to self or others as a result of that mental illness."7 6 Mental
illness is one type of mental defect, and, in most states, dementia qual-
ifies as a mental illness for purposes of civil commitment. The dan-
gerousness prong for civil commitment can also convert a mental ill-
ness into a sufficiently serious mental defect to justify gun
disqualification.78
Courts have pretty consistently upheld the federal mental
health provisions.79 This should not be surprising given the aforemen-
tioned dicta from Heller: "nothing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by... the mentally ill."8 Some courts rely on the Heller dicta with no
81
further analysis. Other courts have reached the same conclusion ap-
75. Petramala v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. CV 10-2002-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL
3880826, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2011), affid, 481 Fed. Appx. 395 (9th Cir. 2012). The
Obama administration has proposed an expansion of the "mentally defective"
prohibitor for certain individuals receiving government benefits on the basis of
mental disabilities. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 20 C.F.R. Part 421,
Docket No. SSA-2016-0011, Implementation of the NICS Improvement Amend-
ments Act of 2007, https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.
gov/2016-10424.pdf.
76. Stephanie A. Evans & Karen L. Salekin, Involuntary Civil Commitment:
Communicating with the Court Regarding "Danger To Other," 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
325, 325 (2014).
77. "Alzheimer's disease is not only the most common disease affecting the
mental state of older people, it is the most common justification for the initial civil
commitment of older people who had never previously suffered from a mental
disorder." Arlene S. Kanter, Abandoned But Not Forgotten: The Illegal Confinement of
Elderly People in State Psychiatric Institutions, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC'Y. CHANGE
273, 280 (1991/1992). But see In re Helen E.F., 814 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 2012). For an
argument in favor of allowing short-term civil commitment of individuals with
dementia, see Caroline N. Harada & Fredrick E. Vars, Last Resort of Individuals with
Dementia Threatened, 60 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y. 2185 (2012).
78. Harada, supra note 77.
79. Petramala, 2011 WL 3880826, at *2 (Other courts have reached the same
conclusion applying heightened scrutiny); United States v. Johnson, No. CR15-
3035-MWB, 2016 WL 212366 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 19, 2016) (magistrate), affid, 2016 WL
614727 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 16, 2016). The outlier is Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff's
Dept., 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014), which was limited to the conmitment prong
and which has been vacated pending rehearing en banc.
80. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
81. E.g., Petramala, 2011 WL 3880826, at *2; United States v. McRobie, No. 08-
4632, 2009 WL 82715, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (per curiam); United States v.
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812plying heightened scrutiny. A possible outlier is the recent Sixth Cir-
cuit decision in Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriffs Department." That
opinion purports to affirm only an as-applied challenge to the com-
mitment prong under intermediate scrutiny, but did so in terms that
arguably reach more broadly.
Federal law impacts only a tiny fraction of people with demen-
tia.5 Data on adult guardianship is spotty, but one best estimate is 1.5
86million active cases nationally. One study of guardianships and con-
servatorships in Kansas showed that nearly sixty percent were based
on developmental disabilities, whereas only sixteen percent were
premised on an "aging related disability."8 7 In contrast, there are esti-
mated to be at least five million people with age-related dementia in
the United States.8" Plainly, the vast majority of people with dementia
are not under guardianship." Recent civil commitment numbers are
hard to find. In 1980, there were 306,468.90 Commitments based on
dementia alone likely constitute a small fraction.91
Murphy, 681 F. Supp. 2d 95, 103 (D. Me. 2010); United States v. Roy, 742 F. Supp.
2d 150, 152 (D. Me. 2010).
82. See Johnson, 2016 WL 212366. See also Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock
Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right To Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
17, 22 (2013) (predicting that "most courts would likely conclude that the federal
restriction is substantially related to the important government interest[s] in curb-
ing gun violence" and gun suicide).
83. Tyler v. Hillsdale Country Sheriff's Dept., 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2014) (en
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90. John Monahan & Saleem Shah, Dangerousness and Commitment of the Men-
tally Disordered in the United States, 15 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 541, 549 (1990).
91. Commitments for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, for example, are
probably much more common. In Belgium in 1998, only 2.2% of civil commitments
involved dementia. Hans Joachim Salize & Harald Dressing, Epidemiology of Invol-
untary Placement of Mentally Ill People Across the European Union, 184 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 163, 167 (2004).
VOLUME 25
NUMBER 1 DEMENTIA AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
C. Relaxing the Mental Illness Requirement
Under Indiana law, a police officer may seize firearms from an
individual if the police officer believes that person is "dangerous."9 2 If
a search warrant is required to effect the seizure, the police officer can
obtain one by showing probable cause exists to believe that the indi-
vidual is "dangerous" and in possession of a firearm." This might ap-
pear to eliminate the mental illness requirement completely, but, un-
less the danger is imminent, "dangerousness" requires either "a
mental illness that may be controlled by medication" or "a propensity
for violent or emotionally unstable conduct." Because dementia can-
not be "controlled" by medication,95 a history of violent or unstable
conduct would almost certainly be required for someone with demen-
tia to lose their firearms under this regime.
California has an analogous regime that authorizes a "tempo-
rary emergency gun violence restraining order" for individuals who
present "an immediate and present danger of causing personal injury"
with a firearm.1 A one-year restraining order equires a "significant"
rather than "immediate" danger.9 7 No mental illness is required in
California either for short-term or longer-term gun confiscation.99
I have proposed an alternative approach that would revoke
gun rights not because a person seems "dangerous" based on past be-
havior, but because the person is experiencing symptoms that make
gun ownership dangerous.99 Whatever they may have done or not
92. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-3(a) (West 2016).
93. Id. at § 35-47-14-2(1)(A).
94. Id. at § 35-47-14-1(2)(A).
95. Dementia medications appear to delay slightly the progression of the dis-
ease, but do so with potentially significant side effects. William James Deardorff et
al., The Use of Cholinesterase Inhibitors Across All Stages of Alzheimer's Disease, 32
DRUGS & AGING 537, 537 (2015). The behavioral and psychological symptoms of
dementia are arguably the most relevant to firearm safety and for them there are
no approved medications. See H. Karl Greenblatt & David J. Greenblatt, Use of An-
tipsychotics for the Treatment of Behavioral Symptoms of Dementia, J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 1048, 1048 (2016) ("There are currently no FDA-approved treat-
ments specifically for behavioral and psychological symptoms of dementia."); see
also Rajesh R. Tampi & Deena J. Tampi, Efficacy and Tolerability of Benzodiazepines for
the Treatment of Behavioral and Psychological Symptoms of Dementia: A Systematic Re-
view of Randomized Controlled Trials, 29 AM. J. ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE & OTHER
DEMENTISs 565, 565 (2014) ("Available data, although limited, does not support
the routine use of benzodiazepines for the treatment of [behavioral and psycholog-
ical symptoms of dementia].").
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18125 (2016).
97. Id. at § 18175(b)(1).
98. Id. at §§ 18125, 18175.
99. Vars, Symptom, supra note 16, at 1638-1642.
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done in the past, people suffering from delusions or hallucinations
should not have access to firearms. There are three main advantages
of this symptom-based approach: (1) it would permit gun seizure be-
fore, rather than after, dangerous symptoms produce injury; (2) be-
cause the presence of psychotic symptoms is more objective than pre-
dictions of dangerousness based on propensities, police discretion and
potential abuse would be narrower than in Indiana; and, related,
(3) police could therefore be trusted to make these judgments rather
than waiting for a court order, as in California.1oo
These advantages may be particularly important in the context
of dementia. In one study of fourteen elderly psychiatric patients who
attempted or committed homicide, ten had a diagnosis of dementia,
eight of the attacks were precipitated by delusions, but only two pa-
tients had a history of violence.o An individual suffering from delu-
sions without prior violence may not seem "dangerous" and therefore
may not lose gun rights in Indiana or California, but would under my
proposal. One example of a patient from the study illustrates: a seven-
ty-eight-year-old man with Alzheimer's tried to strangle his wife be-
cause he had a delusion that she was having an affair.10 2 The marriage
had not previously been violent.1
The Indiana and California statutes are likely constitutional.
Indeed, the Indiana regime has already survived a state constitutional
challenge.'os And at least one commentator has argued that the Cali-
fornia regime passes federal constitutional muster.'0o The common de-
nominator is that, by expressly targeting dangerous individuals, these
measures are narrowly tailored to the state's compelling interest in
reducing gun fatalities and injuries.lo Connecticut has a similar statute
100. To be sure, court approval may be quite expeditious by, say, having a
judge rule over the phone.
101. Stephen B. Ticehurst et al., Homicidal Behaviour in Elderly Patients Admitted
to a Psychiatric Hospital, 3 DEMENTIA 86, 89-90 (1992).
102. Id. at 88 (Case 10).
103. Id.
104. Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
105. Id.
106. Lauren Paglini, How Far Will the Strictest State Push the Limits: The Constitu-
tionality of California's Proposed Gun Law under the Second Amendment, 23 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC'Y. POL'Y & L. 459 (2015).
107. Redington, 992 N.E.2d at 834 ("The Act seeks to keep firearms from indi-
viduals it deems 'dangerous' if and when they present a risk of personal injury to
either themselves or other individuals."); Paglini, supra note 106, at 482 ("The bill
narrowly aims at seizing firearms from only those who are proven as a significant
threat to themselves or others.").
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and enough experience applying it to evaluate how well it is tai-
lored.08 One study estimates "approximately [one] averted suicide for
every [ten] to [eleven] gun seizure cases. "' That is a very good fit, cer-
tainly much closer than existing federal law.o
My proposal is arguably less narrowly tailored. I have else-
where defended its constitutionality on the ground that it is targeted
to symptoms that are demonstrably dangerous and imposes only a
temporary burden."' In addition, I have argued that this proposed
limitation on gun rights is perfectly consistent with the Second
Amendment's core purpose of self-defense.112 A valid self-defense
claim requires objective reasonableness, which a delusional or hallu-
cinating individual is incapable of exercising." The progressive and
incurable nature of dementia strengthens the case for constitutionali-
ty."4 Some demented individuals with delusions may be harmless to-
day, but they will eventually lose the ability to use firearms responsi-
bly."' As argued above, any erroneous deprivation will therefore be
only temporary.
III. Voluntary Restriction
The right to bear arms is waivable, so voluntary self-restriction
116
presents no serious constitutional concerns. This is already taking
place, with doctors counseling dementia patients and families to re-
"17
strict firearm access. Even so, many people with dementia have ac-
cess to firearms: as noted above, one study found that sixty percent of
households with a demented family member had firearms." But even
108. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut's
Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 23
(forthcoming).
109. Id.
110. Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a
Right To Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 22 (2013) (providing a very rough
estimate that "the federal restriction denies gun rights to about 450 former patients
who would not use a firearm to commit suicide for every gun suicide it prevents").
111. Vars, Symptom, supra note 16, at 1643.
112. Id. at 1643-45.
113. Id. at 1634.
114. Id.
115. See Kua et al., supra note 14, at 197.
116. Fredrick E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1465,
1494-97 (2015).
117. Mario F. Mendez, Dementia and Guns, 44 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 409,409-
10 (1996).
118. Spangenberg, supra note 6 (another study found a much lower percentage
(17%), but with a self-selected sample); Hsieh, supra note 5, at 486 tbl.1.
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if that number were zero, there would be a gaping loophole: in the
vast majority of states, someone with dementia can legally purchase a
119
gun.
This loophole can have tragic consequences. In 2005, a sixty-
five-year-old Oklahoma man walked into the Hominy Diner during
the lunch rush and fatally shot a young waitress three times: once in
the mouth and twice in the back.12 0 He had purchased the 9 mm hand-
gun earlier that same day.121 A few years before that, the man had won
a citizen-of-the-year in the town for his volunteer work.122 At the time
of the crime, he suffered from dementia.123
Individuals ought to be able to close this loophole themselves,
by waiving their right to purchase a firearm.124 Specifically, either in
hard-copy or through a secure website, people diagnosed with de-
mentia should be able to opt to have their names added to the federal
background check system, thereby preventing future gun purchases
from licensed dealers. This option could prevent homicides, like the
one in Oklahoma, but also suicides and gun accidents.
I have elsewhere established that many people overall would
self-restrict gun purchases in this way, with especially high sign-up
rates among the mentally ill.12 In one study, forty-six percent of two
hundred people seeking psychiatric care said they would give up
their ability to immediately purchase a gun.126 This option should be
particularly appealing for someone diagnosed with dementia. With
dementia, cognitive decline to a mental state unsafe for gun posses-
sion will eventually occur in every patient who lives long enough.12 7
So while a person with depression may never become suicidal, a per-
son with dementia at some point will not understand the risks of gun
119. See generally Greene, supra note 50.
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use and abuse. Removing guns from the equation should appeal to
many with early stage dementia.
IV. Conclusion
The measures discussed above can be conceptualized as fol-






Each circle can be subdivided. The narrowest possible approach
is to leave gun access up to individual choice. A slightly broader, still
voluntary, approach is to allow individuals to waive their gun pur-
chase rights.
Such voluntary approaches are unobjectionable but will never
eliminate all risks. Some people who are no longer safe with firearms
insist on keeping them. Just recall the ninety-year-old widow in the
introduction.128
The current federal approach represents a small expansion
outward from purely voluntary measures. It reduces risk, but only for
a tiny fraction of people with dementia. The middle circle goes broad-
er, to incorporate dangerousness and symptom-based approaches.
Mandatory firearm safety testing triggered by a dementia diagnosis is
a funnel with a wider top, but only those who fail an objective test of
128. Russakoff, supra note 18.
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their gun safety abilities will be deprived of firearms. These reach
modestly further and do not raise serious constitutional issues.
On the other hand, a ban on gun purchase and possession by
anyone diagnosed with dementia (the outermost circle) may well vio-
late the Second Amendment. Trimming back such a ban to prohibit
purchase but not possession could arguably tip the scales in favor of
constitutionality.
In sum, legislatures are generally free to address the problem
of dementia and guns. How to strike the balance between liberty and
safety is particularly challenging in this context. Many older people
want to keep their firearms even as they descend further into demen-
tia, but at some point, the risk of harm becomes too great.
V. Recommendations
I recommend that current efforts to persuade those with de-
mentia to voluntarily relinquish their firearms be immediately sup-
plemented with a system to allow such individuals to prevent their
own future gun purchases. The cost of this proposal is very low and,
because it is voluntary, it does not implicate the Second Amendment.
Similarly, I recommend adding to current federal law new re-
strictions based on dangerousness and symptoms. Such restrictions
are focused narrowly on people with substantially heightened risk of
gun misuse.
I am ambivalent about the next step: mandatory doctor-
reporting coupled with firearm safety testing. The start-up cost of
such a program, plus the potentially negative impact on the doctor-
patient relationship, is weighty. On the other hand, a well-designed
test could disqualify just the right people.
The diagnosis-based restrictions in Texas and Hawaii strike me
as too broad. There are connections between dementia nd violence
and suicide, but the relationships are not as strong as with civil com-
mitment, for example. Many people with mild dementia can be re-
sponsible with firearms.
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